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REAL PROPERTY: PURCHASE, SALE,
TITLE, AND OWNERSHIP
by
William R. Creasey*

URING the survey period the decided cases in the area of real property law were numerous. Consequently, an extensive treatment of
each case is beyond the scope of this Article. The discussion that
follows is concerned primarily with cases that are noteworthy because of
their subject matter, their results, or the principles of law that they
enunciate.
I.

PURCHASE AND SALE

Offer and Acceptance. Dempsey v. King1 held that a seller could withdraw
acceptance of an earnest money contract after she had signed the contract
but before the contract was delivered to the buyers. 2 A portion of the sellers'
divorce decree and property settlement agreement directed the husband to
attempt to sell the family residence. The husband and the buyers executed a
contract of sale, and the husband then delivered the contract to the wife for
her signature. The wife signed the contract and returned it to the husband.
The next day, the wife orally notified the husband that she did not intend to
go through with the sale. Later that same day, the husband informed one of
the buyers that the wife had signed the contract. Although the opinion does
not indicate how the wife communicated her withdrawal of acceptance to
the buyers, the court upheld the trial court's finding that all parties were
aware of the wife's withdrawal prior to the buyers' receipt of the signed contract.3 At closing, the husband conveyed his interest in their house to the
buyers. The wife neither attended the closing nor executed an instrument of
conveyance.
In affirming the trial court's judgment denying specific performance to the
* B.A., LL.B., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Pettit & Martin, Dallas,
Texas. The author wishes to express his gratitude to Steven A. Hollis, Robert J. Kerwin, and
Jack T. Gannon, whose time and efforts made this Article possible.
1. 662 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ dism'd).
2. Id. at 726-27.
3. Id. at 726. The court stated: "Evidence in the record amply supports the findings by
the jury and the trial court that all parties were aware of [the wife's] withdrawal of acceptance
before actual manual or physical 'delivery' of the earnest money contracts back to the purchasers." Id. Later in the opinion the court found that the wife "communicated the fact of her
withdrawal of such acceptance to the other parties to the agreement two days before delivery
of the instrument to the purchaser by her former spouse." Id. at 727.
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buyers, the court stressed that the offeree must communicate acceptance of
an offer to buy real property to the offeror. 4 The buyers conceded that the
husband was not their agent; therefore, the court found that the wife's deliv5
ery of the contract to the husband did not constitute delivery to the buyers.
The court held that the wife had effectively withdrawn her acceptance of the
contract when she communicated such withdrawal to the buyers prior to
their receipt of the contract. 6 The buyers, however, argued that the mailbox
rule applied. 7 They contended that the act of the wife returning the signed
contract to the husband was the equivalent of mailing it to the purchasers.
The court dismissed that argument and explained that the mailbox rule applies only in situations in which the person who mails an acceptance, the
offeree, desires that the contract be upheld.8 The court found no authority
for applying the rule to bind the offeree. 9
The Houston court of appeals in Vallone v. Miller' ° outlined the necessary
elements of a valid agreement to convey joint management community property. In Vallone the husband executed a contract of sale covering such property, but the wife did not sign the contract despite the fact that the contract
provided for execution by both husband and wife. The buyer sought to compel either sale of the entire property or sale of the husband's one-half interest. The court confirmed that a husband has the right to convey his interest
in nonhomestead joint management community property without the signature of his wife on the conveyance.1 The court stated, however, that to
compel the husband to convey his interest, a valid and complete contract to
convey must exist.' 2 The court found the contract incomplete on its face
and incapable of specific enforcement.1 3 The court noted that the property
4
was not described in terms of the husband's undivided one-half interest.'
Moreover, the terms of the document evidenced the parties' intent that the
agreement would be effective only upon execution by both husband and wife
as sellers, since the buyers intended to purchase the interests of both the
4. Id. at 726. The court cited American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Warnock, 131 Tex. 457, 114
S.W.2d 1161 (1938), as representative of a line of authority that requires communicated
acceptance.
5. 662 S.W.2d at 727.
6. Id. at 726-27.
7. Id. at 727. The term "mailbox rule" was apparently used by the court to refer to the
principle of contract law whereby an offer is considered accepted when the acceptance is
mailed if the offer was made by letter or the parties agreed that the offer could be accepted by
letter. See 14 TEX. JUR. 3D Contracts § 77 (1981).

8. 662 S.W.2d at 727.
9. Id.
10. 663 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
11. Id. at 98; see Williams v. Portland State Bank, 514 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1974, writ dism'd).
12. 663 S.W.2d at 98. For example, in Williams v. Portland State Bank, 514 S.W.2d 124
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ dism'd), new conveyance documents were prepared for

the husband alone to execute after the wife refused to sign the original documents intended to
be executed by both husband and wife. The court held that the new documents, executed by
the husband, conveyed the husband's interest in the joint management community property.
Id. at 127.
13. 663 S.W.2d at 98.
14. Id.
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husband and the wife.1 5 The court, therefore, found no basis for compelling
the husband to convey his undivided one-half interest.1 6 In addition, the
court held that the agreement was insufficient to compel sale of the entire
property.1 7 The court pointed out that absent a special agreement between
the spouses, one spouse alone cannot convey joint management community
property. 18 Because no evidence of such an agreement was present in this
9
case, the husband had no authority to contract to sell the entire property.1
Covenants and Conditions. In Rhodessa Development Co. v. Simpson 20 the El
Paso court of appeals determined that an earnest money contract that conditioned the buyer's performance upon the buyer's obtaining a zoning change
placed an implied obligation on the buyer to use due diligence to obtain such
a change. 21 Seller and buyer had entered into an earnest money contract
pursuant to which the buyer deposited with a title company $20,000 earnest
money to be paid to the seller as liquidated damages if the buyer failed to
perform. If the buyer failed to obtain a zoning change by a specified date,
the buyer had the right to terminate the contract and receive a refund of the
earnest money. The buyer hired engineers and land planners to develop a
proposal for submission to the local zoning authority. The buyer then consulted local counsel, who advised that the zoning commission would probable reject the proposal. The buyer decided not to request a zoning change.
After the deadline for obtaining the necessary zoning change had passed, the
buyer filed suit to recover the earnest money. Although the buyer asserted
that the zoning change was a condition precedent that had not been satisfied, 22 the court of appeals upheld the trial court's award of the earnest
money to the seller. 23 The court found no Texas case on point, but relied on
cases from Maryland 24 and Connecticut 25 to conclude that the buyer had an
15. Id.
16. Id. at 98-99.
17. Id. at 99.
18. Id.; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Vernon 1975).
19. 663 S.W.2d at 99.
20. 658 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ).
21. Id. at 220-21.
22. The buyer relied on a line of cases holding that no breach of the duty to purchase
occurs if the sales contract contains a condition precedent that has not been satisfied. Id. at
219; see Berman v. Rife, 644 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(condition must be fulfilled in exact manner expressed in contract before promisor can be
required to perform); Knox v. Townes, 470 S.W.2d 290, 292 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no
writ) (until condition occurs or is performed no liability on part of promisor arises).
23. 658 S.W.2d at 221. The trial court found that the buyer did not use due diligence in
the performance of its obligation to seek a zoning change pursuant to the contract and that the
seller, therefore, was entitled to recover the earnest money as liquidated damages for breach of
the contract. Id. at 219.
24. Giba v. Bastian, 246 Md. 508, 229 A.2d 93 (1967). The contract in Giba provided
that it would be null and void unless the buyer acquired and obtained rezoning of four separate
parcels of land that were under contract to the buyer from four separate sellers. The contract
also contained an express provision requiring the buyer to take all reasonable steps to obtain
the zoning change. After several attorneys advised the buyer that a zoning change probably
would be denied, the buyer decided not to file for a zoning change and obtained the agreement
of all but one of the property owners with whom he had contracted to rescind their contracts.
The remaining seller, Bastian, sued the buyer for failure to perform. The court stated that if
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implied obligation to use due diligence to obtain the zoning change. 2 6 The
court concluded that by failing to file for the change, the buyer did not exer27
cise due diligence.
Major Investments, Inc. v. De Castillo28 involved a contract of sale that
conditioned the buyer's performance upon her ability to obtain suitable financing. The buyer applied to a single lending institution and was rejected
because she had insufficient assets and income. The buyer made no further
effort to obtain financing. The court indicated that for the buyer to avoid the
contract on the basis of failure of the financing condition, the buyer must
establish that she attempted in good faith to obtain such financing. 29 The
court found the buyer's single attempt to obtain financing insufficient to satisfy the good faith requirement as a matter of law. 30 The court, therefore,
reversed the trial court's grant of the buyer's motion for summary judgment
31
and remanded the issue of good faith for determination by the factfinder.
In Homer v. Bourland32 the seller and buyer entered into a contract for
the sale of real estate. The contract provided that the seller would refinance
a note secured by a deed of trust on the property. The buyer would then
assume that note and, in addition, execute a promissory note in favor of the
seller secured by a second deed of trust. When the seller was unable to refinance the first note, the buyer filed suit for specific performance and made an
oral offer to pay the full purchase price in cash. Seller rejected the offer on
the ground that a full cash payment would cause him to suffer adverse income tax consequences. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized that both parties had mistakenly assumed that the first note could be
refinanced. 3 3 The court, nevertheless, held that such a mutual mistake did
not render the contract unenforceable because the mistake concerned a matter that was collateral to the contract.3 4 In so ruling, the court cited a
the Bastian contract had been the only contract involved and the buyer had failed to apply for
rezoning, a breach of contract entitling the seller to recover damages would have occurred. Id.
at 96. The court found, however, that the buyer had obtained in good faith reliable evidence
that a zoning change could not be obtained. Id. Reasoning that the other sellers had the right
to rescind their contract based on the evidence obtained by the buyer, the court denied recovery because the Bastian contract was contingent upon both rezoning and acquisition of all of
the tracts for which the buyer had contracted. Id. at 97.
25. Battistelli v. Corso, 30 Conn. Supp. 135, 304 A.2d 676 (Super. Ct. 1973). In Battistelli
the contract provided that the sale was contingent upon the buyer's obtaining zoning approval
for construction. The court held that the contract also contained an implied promise that the
buyer would apply for a zoning change within a reasonable time. 304 A.2d at 679.
26. 658 S.W.2d at 220-21.
27. Id. at 221. The result reached by the court in Rhodessa is questionable if it means that
a buyer whose contractual performance is contingent upon rezoning must actively pursue a
zoning change even if after execution of the contract the buyer realizes that such effort would
be an exercise in futility. Requiring such an effort in these circumstances would force the
buyer to waste considerable time and money.
28. 673 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. Id. at 279.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 279, 282.
32. 724 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1984).
33. Id. at 1145.
34. Id. The Fifth Circuit quoted Turberville v. Upper Valley Farms, Inc., 616 S.W.2d 676
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ), in which the court stated that "[a] mutual
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number of Texas cases holding that a cash offer in lieu of a contractually
specified financing provision constitutes substantial compliance. 35 In response to the seller's complaint of adverse income tax consequences, the
court explained that the decree of specific performance must be conditioned
upon the buyer's compensating the seller for additional taxes incurred as a
result of the cash payment. 36 Because the buyer's oral offer of cash did not
constitute a material alteration of the original agreement, the court rejected
the seller's argument that the offer failed to comply with the statute of
37
frauds.
Options. In Hott v. Pearcy/Christon,Inc. 38 the buyer and seller entered into
a purchase contract for real estate that conditioned the buyer's performance
upon an ability to obtain suitable financing. The contract did not require the
buyer to make an earnest money deposit upon execution of the contract;
rather, it required the buyer to make a series of deposits to extend the financing condition. The contract also limited the seller's remedy for the buyer's
default to retention of the buyer's earnest money deposits. Prior to the
buyer's payment of the first installment of earnest money, the seller repudiated the contract. The buyer sued for specific performance. Deciding in
favor of the seller, the court determined that the contract granted an option
that was revoked prior to payment of the consideration necessary to make
the option irrevocable. 39 The court's determination was based upon the conmistake of fact ... occurs when both parties to a transaction have '. . . a belief in the present
existence of a thing, material to the transaction, that does not exist .... ' " Id. at 678 (quoting 38 TEX. JUR. 2D Mistake § 1 (1962)). The Homer court thus decided that the relevant
inquiry in a case involving mutual mistake is whether the mistake is material. 724 F.2d at
1145. The court cited advance Components, Inc. v. Goodstein, 608 S.W.2d 737 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), which quoted from the Restatement of the Law of Contracts a list of factors for determining materiality:
(a) The extent to which the injured party will obtain the substantial benefit
which he could have reasonably anticipated;
(b) The extent to which the injured party may be adequately compensated in
damages for lack of complete performance; [and]
(c) The extent to which the party failing to perform has already partly performed or made preparations for performance ....
Id. at 740 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 275 (1932)); see also Durham v. Uvalde
Rock Asphalt Co., 559 S.W.2d 866, 877 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ) (statement of materiality standard).
35. 724 F.2d at 1146; see Advance Components, Inc. v. Goodstein, 608 S.W.2d 737, 740
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Renouf v. Martini, 577 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1979, no writ); accord Smith v. Nash, 571 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ). But see Kitten v. Vaughn, 397 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1965, no writ), in which the Austin court of civil appeals stated that "[o]ne first
lien note and one lender for $160,000.00 is not substantially the equivalent of one first lien note
for $100,000.00 payable to A and one second lien note for $60,000.00 payable to B. It is to be
noted that [the sellers] did not offer to finance the entire $160,000.00." Id. at 533.
36. 724 F.2d at 1149; see Advance Components, Inc. v. Goodstein, 608 S.W.2d 737, 740
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
37. 724 F.2d at 1148-49.
38. 663 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
39. Id. at 853. The buyer had prepared the contract and the seller had accepted it subject
to certain counter-proposals inserted in the contract. The buyer approved the counter-proposals, but made additional changes to the contract before signing it. The seller alleged that these
alterations were material and, consequently, the contract became a counter-offer that the seller
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tractual limitation of the buyer's liability and upon the financing contingency. 40 The court noted that the buyer had neither tendered nor paid any
consideration to the seller prior to the seller's written rejection of the contract. 4' Generally, the court noted, mutual promises on the part of a buyer
and seller are sufficient to create a binding contract to convey land. 42 Nevertheless, such promises are insufficient when the contract limits the buyer's
liability to forfeiture of the earnest money. 43 The court held that such a
limitation results in an option to purchase that is revocable at the will of the
seller until the buyer pays an independent consideration."
Breach and Remedies. Atkin v. Cobb 45 dealt with the issue of whether a
buyer can enforce a real estate sales contract by specific performance and
also recover damages. The sellers and the buyer entered into a purchase
contract for real estate. Prior to the closing, the sellers refused to perform
because they were able to convey only a three-fourths interest in the property. 46 The trial court ordered the sellers to convey their three-fourths interest to the buyer and ordered the buyer to pay the sellers the contract amount
with an abatement proportionate to the deficiency in the sellers' conveyance.
The trial court also awarded the buyer damages for breach of contract. The
sellers contended that the trial court erred in awarding the buyer both damages and specific performance. The San Antonio court of appeals explained
that if delay in performance causes injury to a buyer, damages are properly
awarded as compensation for the injury resulting from the late performance. 47 The court, therefore, held that the trial court properly awarded
damages for breach of contract in addition to partial specific performance, to
the extent that the damages represented compensation for the loss suffered
by the buyer due to delay in performance. 48 The court held, however, that
the portion of the damage award that compensated the buyer for the loss of
never accepted. Because the court held that the contract granted an option that was validly
revoked, the court found it unnecessary to reach the counter-offer issue. Id.
40. Id. The financing provision did not require earnest money to be paid up front. Instead, the contract required the buyer to pay $5,000 within 16 days from the effective date of
the contract. The seller sent a written rejection of the contract to the buyer prior to the buyer's
tender of the $5,000 consideration. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. The court cited Echols v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1972, writ refd n.r.e.), in which the Houston court of appeals held that an option
contract within a sales contract is revocable until consideration passes under either the sales
contract or the option contract itself. Id. at 800.
45. 663 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ).
46. The remaining one-fourth interest was owned by the wife of one of the sellers. The
wife was not a party to the contract and refused to convey her interest to the buyer. Id. at 50.
47. Id. at 51. The court of appeals stated that performance pursuant to a court order is
not timely compliance with a contract. Id.; see Foust v. Hanson, 612 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ) (payment of expenses due to late performance appropriate in addition to specific performance); Slaughter v. Roark, 244 S.W.2d 698, 701-03 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1951, writ refed n.r.e.) (damages payable from time demand for performance is
made if such time is later than time set for performance in contract).
48. 663 S.W.2d at 51.
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his bargain on the outstanding one-fourth interest in the property was erroneous. 49 The court noted that the buyer already had obtained an abatement
in the purchase price that he was required to pay in connection with the
award of partial specific performance. 50 The court could find no authority
for also awarding the buyer loss-of-bargain damages for the partial breach
that resulted in the abatement.5 1 The court, nevertheless, left open the possibility that loss-of-bargain damages might be available in the case of bad
52
faith, an element lacking in the present case.
In NRC, Inc. v. Pickhardt53 the buyer sought special damages and rescission of the purchase of two lots made more than ten years before he filed
suit. The buyer based his suit on the seller's fraud in failing to advise the
buyer of the existence of a flooding easement that rendered the lots unsuitable for use as homesites. The seller asserted that the four-year statute of
limitations barred the buyer's claim. The court first observed that a purchaser of land is charged with constructive notice of all information contained in the grantor's chain of title. 54 Since the chain of title disclosed the
flooding easement, the court concluded that the buyer was charged with notice thereof at the time of purchase. 55 The buyer's cause of action for the
seller's failure to disclose the existence of the easement was, therefore, barred
56
as a matter of law.
The court ruled differently, however, with regard to the buyer's cause of
action for the seller's failure to disclose that the lots were unsuitable for use
as homesites. The court held that the seller had a duty to disclose material
facts affecting the suitability of the lots for the buyer's intended use if such
facts were not discoverable through the exercise of ordinary diligence by the
buyer.5 7 The statute of limitations did not begin to run until the buyer either
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The sellers argued that loss-of-bargain damages are never proper unless the defaulting party was guilty of bad faith. The court of appeals disagreed and cited an early case
holding that if the inability of the seller to convey full title resulted from the homestead character of the property, the buyer was entitled to loss-of-bargain damages without reference to
the question of good or bad faith on the part of the husband. Id.; see Goff v. Jones, 70 Tex.
572, 577, 8 S.W. 525, 527 (1888) (expectation damages proper for breach of contract to sell
homestead). But cf Long v. Brown, 593 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ

ref'd n.r.e.) (when seller of land is unable to convey title as agreed, absent fraud the buyer is
limited to recovery of amount paid under contract plus interest). The Atkin court expressly
declined to resolve this inconsistency and instead disallowed loss-of-bargain damages on the
alternative ground that such damages are improper when the buyer is awarded partial specific
performance and a corresponding price abatement. 663 S.W.2d at 51.
53. 667 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, writ dism'd).
54. Id. at 294; see Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 908 (Tex.
1982) (purchaser bound by all information fairly disclosed by any instrument that is an essential link in chain of title under which he claims); Sutton v. Grogan Supply Co., Lumber Div.,
477 S.W.2d 930, 935-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, no writ) (purchaser charged as a
matter of law with constructive notice of contents of all instruments in chain of title).
55. 667 S.W.2d at 294.
56. Id.
57. Id. Specifically, the buyer alleged that the seller had failed to disclose that the lots
were below the 715-foot mean sea level. The 715-foot measurement was critical because the
lots were subject to an easement in favor of the Lower Colorado River Authority that author-
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discovered the fraud or should have discovered it. 58 Because the seller failed
to establish that the buyer should have discovered the fraud more than four
years prior to filing the suit, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
59
judgment in favor of the buyer.
In Fillion v. Troy 6° the appellee was a young woman who had engaged the
appellant, a middle-aged male attorney, to represent her in the administration of her father's estate. During the course of his work, the appellant influenced the appellee to convey significant amounts of real estate and other
property to him. The appellee accused the appellant of breach of the fiduciary relationship, fraud, undue influence, violation of the attorney-client relationship, and violation of various attorney disciplinary rules. The trial court
submitted a series of special issues to the jury and upon the verdict granted
61
the appellee both rescission of the conveyances and punitive damages.
The appellant contended that the award of punitive damages in a rescission case was improper, but the court of appeals held that the weight of
Texas authority permitted such an award. 62 The appellant also contended
that the Texas statute governing fraud in real estate transactions 63 limited
the award to twice the amount of actual damages. The court found the statute inapplicable because it relates to a sale of land or a contract for the sale
of land and this case did not involve either. 64 The court held that the appellant obtained the deeds by overreaching and by appellee's lack of attentive65
ness, rather than through a contract.
In Grohn v. Marquardt66 the San Antonio court of appeals upheld the
cancellation of a deed on grounds of fraud and undue influence. 67 The evidence in the case established that the grantor, a single man, engaged in sexual relations with one of the grantees over a period of several years, a
relationship which the grantee allegedly initiated. The relationship
culminated in the grantor's conveyance of his ranch to the grantee and her
husband, who had also befriended the grantor. The grantor testified that he
ized flooding the land below the 715-foot mean sea level contour level. None of the seller's
sales information supplied to the buyer indicated that the lots were below the 715-foot line. Id.
See Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 657-58 (Tex. 1979), for the
Texas Supreme Court's disposition of a case with similar facts.
58. 667 S.W.2d at 294; see Mooney v. Harlin, 622 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. 1981).
59. 667 S.W.2d at 294.
60. 656 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. The jury found that the appellant did not make reasonable use of the confidence
placed in him by the appellee, that the transactions were not fair and equitable to the appellee,
that the appellant did not act in good faith in informing the appellee of the nature and effect of
the transactions, that appellee acted upon appellant's fraudulent representations that certain
transactions were for their mutual benefit, and that appellant obtained the property through
the use of undue influence. Id. at 914.
62. Id. at 915; Russell v. Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948, 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); see International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 583-84
(Tex. 1963) (court of equity can grant punitive damages incidental to equitable relief).
63. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 27.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1985).
64. 656 S.W.2d at 915.
65. Id.
66. 657 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67. Id. at 855-56.
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had conveyed his ranch to the grantee and her husband out of feelings of
love for both of them. The grantees presented evidence that the grantor was
motivated by his belief in the grantees' representations that they would pay
the outstanding indebtedness and taxes on the ranch, convey a life estate to
the grantor, and permit him to retain seventy-five percent of the ranching
profits. Shortly after the conveyance, the grantees became less friendly with
the grantor, and approximately three years later the grantor filed suit seeking to set aside the conveyance to the grantees.
The grantees argued that the grantor's immoral conduct was contrary to
public policy and, therefore, barred the grantor from obtaining the equitable
relief he sought under the unclean hands doctrine. The San Antonio court
of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court's decision in favor of the
grantor. 68 The court confirmed that the unclean hands doctrine required
69
that one who comes into a court of equity must come with clean hands.
The court found, however, that the doctrine does not apply when the cause
of action is based on fraud and undue influence. 70 The court explained that
to cancel a deed on the grounds of fraud, false representations of a material
fact must have been made and the party being deceived must have believed
and relied upon those representations. 71 Undue influence, the court pointed
out, may also serve as a basis for cancellation of a deed. 72 The court held
that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the grantor's relationship
with the grantees was sufficient to support the grantor's claims of fraud and
undue influence. 73 The doctrine of unclean hands, therefore, had no
74
application.
Rescission. In Givens v. Dougherty7 5 the Texas Supreme Court held that the
mutual oral rescission of a contract for a commission for the sale of real
estate is unenforceable. 76 The court first pointed out that under Texas law
contracts for real estate commissions are themselves within the statute of
frauds. 77 The court then acknowledged that the issue of rescission of such
68. Id.
69. Id. at 855; see Munzenrieder & Assocs. v. Daigle, 525 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ).
70. 657 S.W.2d at 855.
71. Id.; see Booth v. Chadwick, 154 S.W.2d 268, 272 ( Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941,
writ ref'd w.o.m.).
72. 657 S.W.2d at 855.
73. Id.

74. Id. at 855-56.
75. 671 S.W.2d 877 ( Tex. 1984).
76. Id. at 878.

77. Id. at 877-78. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985)
provides:
An action may not be brought in a court in this state for the recovery of a
commission for the sale or purchase of real estate unless the promise or agreement on which the action is brought, or some memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged or signed by a person lawfully
authorized by him to sign it.
Id. In Denman v. Hall, 144 Tex. 633, 638, 193 S.W.2d 515, 516 (1946), the Texas Supreme
Court interpreted this statutory provision as falling within the ambit of the statute of frauds.
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contracts was one of first impression.7 8 The court, nevertheless, observed
that several Texas cases have dealt with oral rescission of other types of
contracts required to be in writing.7 9 The court stated that with the exception of Nutt v. Berry,80 in which the El Paso court of civil appeals upheld the
oral rescission of a written lease agreement, 8 ' the majority of Texas cases
82
hold that a contract required to be in writing may not be orally rescinded.
Even though it conceded that virtually all of the commentators favor a contrary result,8 3 the court adopted what it perceived to be the majority view,
concluding that the purpose of the statute of frauds would be frustrated if a
contract required to be in writing could be orally rescinded.8 4 The court
expressed its concern that to hold otherwise would encourage claims of oral
rescission whenever the terms of a contract become burdensome to one of
85
the parties.
Justice Spears dissented in an opinion joined by Justice Wallace. The dissent stated that no Texas authority governed the present case.8 6 Justice
Spears claimed that the cases cited by the majority did not support the ma87
jority opinion, but were consistent with the prevailing view to the contrary.
Justice Spears noted that the prevailing view is already subject to the qualification that if the rescission, because of its subject matter, is itself within the
ambit of the statute of frauds, then the rescission must be in writing.88 For
example, rescission of a contract to sell real estate must be in writing since
termination of the contract effectively constitutes a reconveyance.8 9 Explaining that the purpose of the statute of frauds is to establish the precise
terms of the agreement between the parties, Justice Spears emphasized that
in the present case no dispute as to the terms of the contract was present. 90
The question presented was whether the contract had been terminated, a
question of fact that could be decided by a jury in the same manner that the
78. 671 S.W.2d at 878.
79. Id.
80. 323 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, no writ).
81. Id. at 502-03.
82. 671 S.W.2d at 878. The court cited Dial v. Crane, 10 Tex. 444, 454 (1853); Gardner
v. Sittig, 222 S.W. 1090, 1090 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, judgmt adopted); Reyes v. Smith, 288
S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
83. 671 S.W.2d at 878. The court noted that according to 72 AM. JUR. 2D Statute of
Frauds§ 282 (1974), "the trend of modem authority seems to be toward the view that an oral
rescission of an executory contract is valid notwithstanding that the contract rescinded was
one required by the statute of frauds to be in writing." Id.; see, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS,

§§

19-37 (2d ed. 1977); 2 A.

CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

§

302

(1950); 4 S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 592 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1961); J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 332 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 148
(1981); Williston, Rescission by ParolAgreement, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 455, 461-62 (1904).
84. 671 S.W.2d at 878.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 879 (Spears, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id.; see J. MURRAY, supra note 83, § 332.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 148 (1981); Williston, supra note 83,
461-62. Justice Spears distinguished the cases cited by the majority in support of its decision
on the ground that they fell within the real property exception to oral rescission. 671 S.W.2d
at 879.

90. 671 S.W.2d at 879.
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jury decides other factual determinations regarding performance or
breach. 9 1
II.

TITLE AND OWNERSHIP

Legal Description. In Pick v. Barte192 the grantor owned two adjacent tracts
of land, one containing 165 acres and the other containing twenty-five acres.
He sold the 165-acre tract to Pick by a deed that contained the following
language: "Grantors also guarantee grantees, their heirs and assigns, a
right-of-way across the 25-acre tract sold to Walter Bartel." '93 The twentyfive-acre tract was sold to Bartel by a deed that was dated five days later than
the deed to Pick. The Bartel deed stated: "There is also a further stipulation
this conveyance directs that the grantors are designating that a right-of-way
for a road shall be allowed to be had through and over the said 25 acres at a
location which will least interfere with the use of the 25 acres. . ..

-94 Pick

brought suit to enforce his rights under the easement purportedly granted in
his deed.
The Texas Supreme Court noted that an easement is an interest in real
property, the conveyance of which must meet the requirements of the statute
of frauds. 95 One of those requirements is that the property description must
furnish the means or data by which the particular land to be conveyed can
be identified with certainty. 96 The court stated that the identification of the
servient estate is the most essential element of a conveyance of an easement. 97 The identification may not be supplied by parol evidence; the property must be identified in the conveyance itself with sufficient certainty to
98
satisfy the statute of frauds.
The supreme court discussed a line of cases holding that a description in a
conveyance that identifies the property as "my property," "my land," or
"owned by me" is a sufficient description.99 In those cases, however, the
conveyance expressly stated that the grantor was the owner of the property
91. Id,
92. 659 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. 1983).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 636-37.
95. Id. at 637 (citing Anderson v. Tall Timbers Corp., 378 S.W.2d 16, 23 (Tex. 1964)).
The Texas statute of frauds is found in TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968
& Supp. 1985).
96. 659 S.W.2d at 637; see, e.g., Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 99 (Tex. 1981); Morrow
v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. 1972); Wilson v. Fisher, 144 Tex. 53, 56, 188 S.W.2d
150, 152 (1945).
97. 659 S.W.2d at 637.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see Kmiec v. Reagan, 556 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1977); Pickett v. Bishop, 148
Tex. 207, 209, 223 S.W.2d 222, 223 (1949); see also Patterson v. Twaddell, 301 S.W.2d 680,
682, 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (deed conveying "all that certain
property of record in my name in Potter County, Texas" held to be sufficient legal description);
Texas Consol. Oils v. Bartels, 270 S.W.2d 708, 710, 711-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1954,
writ ref'd) (conveyance of "[a]ll the oil, gas and mining leases, royalties and overriding royalties located anywhere within the United States ... owned by [said grantor]" held to be sufficient legal description).
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to be conveyed. 100 Extrinsic evidence was then used to prove that the grantor owned only one tract of land that satisfied the other elements of the
description.10 1 The court then pointed to another Texas Supreme Court
case that emphasized the importance of an explicit statement of ownership in
the conveyance. 10 2 In Wilson v. Fisher10 3 the court stated that the mere
signature of the seller on the deed is not sufficient to prove ownership.' 4
The supreme court concluded that it could not infer that the language in the
Pick deed, "the 25-acre tract sold to Walter Bartel," referred to the alleged
servient estate because the owner of the property referred to in the deed was
not stated therein. 105 Furthermore, since the Pick deed was executed before
the Bartel deed, at the time the Pick deed was executed the twenty-five-acre
tract had not been sold to Bartel. 10 6 Because the deed also failed to include a
city, county, state, lot, or block number designation, the supreme court
found the description deficient in every respect. 107 The court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the words "we guarantee" in the Pick
deed were sufficient words of grant to convey an easement.108
Deed Construction. In Alford v. Krum1' 9 the Texas Supreme Court construed a mineral deed and found that two of the deed's several paragraphs
were in irreconcilable conflict. 110 The first paragraph of the deed conveyed
to the grantee one-half of a one-eighth interest in the mineral estate of a
certain tract of land. Another paragraph stated that the land was subject to
an oil and gas lease and provided that the mineral interest conveyed included
one-sixteenth of certain rents and royalties due to be paid under the terms of
the lease. A third paragraph provided that in the event the oil and gas lease
was cancelled or forfeited, the grantor and grantee would each own a onehalf interest in all of the oil, gas, and other minerals. Because the lease in
effect at the time of the conveyance had expired, the issue presented to the
court was the quantum of the permanent mineral interest conveyed by the
deed. 11
The court noted that in construing conveyances, the primary duty of
courts is to ascertain the intent of the parties as that intent is expressed by
the instrument of conveyance. 1 2 All parts of the instrument must be harmonized, but when the instrument contains irreconcilable conflicts the court
100. 659 S.W.2d at 637.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 144 Tex. 53, 188 S.W.2d 150 (1945).
104. Id. at 60, 188 S.W.2d at 154.
105. 659 S.W.2d at 638.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 671 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1984).
110. Id. at 873.
111. Id. at 872.
112. Id.; accord Canter v. Lindsey, 575 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978,
writ refd n.r.e.); see Terrell v. Graham, 576 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. 1979).
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must give effect to the controlling language of the instrument.' 13 The court
then stated that in mineral deeds the controlling language is found in the
granting clause, and if the granting clause11 4and the other parts of the deed
conflict, the granting clause must prevail.
The court concluded that the granting clause of the deed in question
clearly conveyed to the grantee an undivided one-sixteenth mineral interest." 5 The court characterized the paragraph of the deed that provided a
one-half mineral interest to the grantee as a future lease clause. 1' 6 Such a
clause, the court stated, is subordinate to the granting clause and is useful
only when the granting clause is unclear.'1 7 The court found the two clauses
to be in irreconcilable conflict 18and held that the unambiguous language of
the granting clause prevailed.
Chief Justice Pope, joined by Justices Campbell and Spears, dissented. 1 9
The dissent focused on the paragraph of the deed providing that if the thenexisting oil and gas lease were to terminate, the grantor and grantee would
each own one-half of the mineral estate. The dissent emphasized that this
clause is not inconsistent with the granting clause because the granting
clause speaks to the quantum of the grant prior to expiration of the lease,
whereas this clause speaks to the quantum of the grant after expiration of the
lease.' 20 The dissent concluded that the parties had thus validly expressed
their intent to convey different estates before and after termination of the
21
lease and that the court should have effectuated that intent.
In a significant departure from previous holdings, the Texas Supreme
Court in Moser v. United States Steel Corp. 122 held that a grant or reservation of "oil, gas and other minerals" 12 3 includes all substances within the
ordinary and natural meaning of the term "minerals," whether their presence or value is known at the time of severance.' 24 In particular the court
held as a matter of law that uranium is a mineral within the ordinary and
natural meaning of the word.' 25 The court thereby abandoned, in the case
taken in determining the meanof uranium, the approach it had previously
1 26
ing of the phrase "other minerals."
Prior to Moser, the court had attempted to create a rule designed both to
give effect to the intent of the parties to convey valuable minerals and to
113. 671 S.W.2d at 872; see Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. v. Masterson, 160 Tex. 548, 552,
334 S.W.2d 436, 439 (1960).
114. 671 S.W.2d at 872.

115. Id. at 874.
116. Id. at 873; see R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 9.1 (2d ed. 1983)
(discussion of use and effect of future lease clauses).
117. 671 S.W.2d at 873.
118. Id. at 873-74.
119. Id. at 874-77 (Pope, C.J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 875.
121. Id. at 875-77.
122. 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
123. Id. at 100.

124. Id. at 102.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 101.
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protect the surface estate from destruction caused by extraction of those
minerals.' 27 In Reed v. Wylie128 the court held that a substance near the
surface is part of the surface estate if any reasonable method of removal
would consume, deplete, or destroy the surface.' 29 In Moser the court noted
that the Reed approach required factual determinations with regard to the
method used to remove the mineral and the effect of that method on the
surface estate.' 30 The court acknowledged that application of the Reed approach had thus created considerable title uncertainty since a review of the
conveyance instrument would not, by itself, reveal who owned title to an
3
unnamed mineral substance.' '
The implication of the holding in Moser is that the court will avoid future
uncertainty by deciding categorically whether, as a matter of law, specified
substances are minerals.' 32 In previous decisions the court has held that
certain substances belong to the surface estate as a matter of law, including,
135 water, 136 sand,' 37
for example, limestone,1 33 caliche,1 34 surface shale,
gravel,' 38 and near-surface lignite, iron, and coal.139 The court emphasized
in Moser that it would continue to adhere to those earlier categorical
decisions. '40
Having established that the mineral owner had title to the uranium, the
court next determined the extent to which the surface estate could be used
by the mineral owner. The court noted that the mineral owner has the right
to make any use of the surface that is necessarily and reasonably incident to
the removal of the minerals.' 4' The court also pointed out that, as a general
rule, the mineral owner's liability for such use is restricted solely to damages
127. See Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980); Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169,
172 (Tex. 1977); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
128. 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980). This case is a second appeal, after remand, of Reed v.
Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977).
129. 597 S.W.2d at 747. In the first appeal of Reed v. Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977),
the supreme court held that the surface owner has title to a mineral if substantial quantities of
the mineral lie so near the surface that extraction as of the date on which the mineral was
reserved or conveyed would necessarily have destroyed the surface. Id. at 172.
130. 676 S.W.2d at 101.
131. Id.
132. Because of the extent to which it felt parties had relied on its previous holdings, the
court held that the rule announced in Moser would apply prospectively from June 8, 1983. Id.
at 103.
133. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949).
134. Atwood v. Rodman, 355 S.W.2d 206, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
135. Id.
136. Fleming Found. v. Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846, 851-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
137. Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947, writ
ref'd).
138. Id.
139. Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747-48 (Tex. 1980).
140. 676 S.W.2d at 102.
141. Id. at 103; see Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Tex. 1972); Getty Oil v.
Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. 1971); Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133,
134 (Tex. 1967).
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negligently inflicted to the surface estate. 142 The court then held that the
general rule restricting liability is inapplicable to a case such as Moser in
which the mineral conveyed or reserved is unspecified. 143 Accordingly, the
court held that the owner of an unnamed substance conveyed pursuant to a
grant or reservation of "other minerals" is liable to the surface owner for
surface destruction whether or not the destruction was negligently caused. 44
Co-tenants. In Manges v. Guerra 4 5 the Texas Supreme Court was concerned with the proper exercise of the executive right of a mineral estate by a
co-tenant holding such right.146 In Manges the executive had been sued by
mineral co-tenants for failing to exercise diligence in leasing the minerals to
third parties and for leasing a portion of the minerals to himself on unfair
terms. The trial court cancelled the lease from the executive to himself,
awarded actual and punitive damages to the co-tenants, and removed the
executive from his position. The Texas Supreme Court recognized that the
relationship between the holder of the executive rights and his co-tenants
imposes upon the executive a fiduciary duty of utmost good faith.' 47 That
duty, the court said, requires the executive to obtain for the nonexecutives
every benefit that he exacts for himself.' 48 Finding that the executive
breached his duty in this case, the court upheld the cancellation of the
lease. 14 9 The court also upheld the damage award after finding that recovery
for breach of a fiduciary duty is not limited to an accounting of profits received by the fiduciary.' 50 The court refused, however, to uphold cancellation of the executive rights since the co-tenants had elected to waive
rescission of the transfer of executive rights to recover damages. '5'
142. 676 S.W.2d at 103; see General Crude Oil v. Aiken Co., 162 Tex. 104, 106-07, 344
S.W.2d 668, 669 (1961); Stradley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 155 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1941, writ ref'd).
143. 676 S.W.2d at 103.
144. Id. The court emphasized that its holding does not affect the statutory duty of the
mineral owner, or his lessee, to reclaim the surface after surface mining. Id. n.4. The Texas
Uranium Surface Mining and Reclamation Act requires an operator who is surface mining
uranium to submit and implement a plan of reclamation or forfeit his performance bond and
be subjected to civil and criminal sanctions. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 131.101-.270
(Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1985).
145. 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
146. The executive right is the exclusive right or power to execute all leases, permits, and
unitization and pooling agreements. The executive right, therefore, is the exclusive right to
develop the mineral estate. See R. HEMINGWAY, supra note 116, § 2.2.
147. 673 S.W.2d at 183; see Schlittler v. Smith, 128 Tex. 628, 631, 101 S.W.2d 543, 545
(1937); Kimsey v. Fore, 593 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, writ refd
n.r.e.).
148. 673 S.W.2d at 183.
149. Id. at 184.

150. Id.; see Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 510 (Tex. 1980); International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963). But cf Amoco

Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571 (Tex. 1981) (suit for breach of contract will not
support a judgment of exemplary damages even if contract is maliciously breached).
151. 673 S.W.2d at 184. The court noted that the jury found that the other co-owners had
been fraudulently induced to sell their lands and, therefore, had the right to rescind the initial
transfer of the executive rights. Id. The thrust of the supreme court's holding, apparently, was
that executive rights are not subject to judicial cancellation even if the executive has breached
his fiduciary duties. In its opinion the Waco court of appeals stated that the act of removing
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In McCarver v. Trumble'5 2 a husband and wife, who were residents of
Colorado, each purchased an undivided one-fourth interest in a tract of land
in Texas. The deed conveying the interests to them recited that the husband
and wife were taking their respective shares of the land as joint tenants with
the right of survivorship and that they were residents of Colorado. The
husband died testate, and, by the terms of his will, his entire estate passed in
equal shares to his sons by a prior marriage. The sons sold the husband's
one-fourth interest in the land, and title was ultimately obtained by the appellants. The appellants contended that the attempt of the husband and wife
to create a joint tenancy with right of survivorship was ineffectual because
the property was community property and a joint tenancy with right of survivorship could not be created with community property under Texas community property law without first partitioning the community property. The
appellants contended alternatively that they were bona fide purchasers without notice of the right of survivorship.
The Corpus Christi court of appeals observed that in Texas a joint tenancy
1 53
with right of survivorship cannot be created with community property.
Rather, if community property is involved, the spouses must partition the
15 4
property and execute a separate instrument to establish a joint tenancy.
The court concluded that the property interest in question was, therefore,
presumed to be community property1 5 5 and that the burden of proof was on
the wife to show otherwise.' 56 The court further stated that although Texas
law applies in determining the rights of nonresidents in Texas realty, 57 the
law of the domicile of the purchasers applies in determining the characterization of the consideration paid for such land. 15 8 The court then found that
the evidence clearly established that the property interests had been
purchased with funds characterized as separate under Colorado law.159 The
court, therefore, concluded that the property interests were separate property and the deed created a valid joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship. 16 0

The court noted that the appellants' bona fide purchaser argument was
predicated on the proposition that the presumption of community property
may not be rebutted as to bona fide purchasers.' 6' The court pointed out
an executive is analogous to the removal of a trustee for breach of fiduciary duties. Manges v.
Guerra, 621 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. App.-Waco 1981), rev'd in part and a/fd in part, 673
S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984). The holding of the supreme court apparently contradicts that
statement.
152. 660 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
153. Id. at 597; see Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 579, 342 S.W.2d 565, 568 (1961).
154. 660 S.W.2d at 597; accord Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. 1981).
155. 660 S.W.2d at 597-98; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
156. 660 S.W.2d at 598; see Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex. 1975).
157. 660 S.W.2d at 597; see Roswurm v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 181 S.W.2d 736, 741
(Tex. Civ. App,-Fort Worth 1944, writ refd w.o.m.).
158. 660 S.W.2d at 598; see Grange v. Kayser, 80 S.W.2d 1007, 1008 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1935, no writ).
159. 660 S.W.2d at 598.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see Boyd v. Orr, 170 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1943, writ
ref'd w.o.m.).
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that to meet the requirements of a bona fide purchaser the appellants must
have been without notice of any third-party claims. 162 The court concluded
that the recitation in the deed as to the place of residence of the husband and
wife, coupled with the finding that the appellants had actual knowledge
thereof, was sufficient3to put the appellants on actual and constructive notice
16
of the wife's claim.
Life Estates and Remainders. In Hudspeth v. Hudspeth' 64 the remaindermen brought an action against the life tenant that sought to quiet title to
minerals and to recover bonuses, royalties, and delay rentals received by the
life tenant as a result of oil and gas leasing and production. The court held
that a prior judgment awarding the life tenant all rents, revenues, and income from the property could not be construed as including royalties and
bonuses. 165 In support of its holding, the court cited the Texas Supreme
Court decision in Clyde v. Hamilton.1 66 That decision reaffirmed the wellestablished rule that the corpus of an estate must be preserved for the remaindermen and, therefore, cannot be disposed of by a life tenant. The
court in Clyde determined that minerals are part of the land and that royal1 67
ties and bonuses are part of the consideration for the sale of the land.
Royalties and bonuses are, thus, part of the corpus preserved for the remaindermen. 1 68 According to the decision in Clyde, however, a life tenant is entior income derived from the
tled to delay rental payments and the interest
1 69
investment of the bonuses and royalties.
The court in Hudspeth recognized the open mine doctrine as an exception
to the foregoing rule. The open mine doctrine permits a life tenant to con1 70
tinue mineral development undertaken by the grantor of the life estate.
The court ruled, however, that absent a specific grant to the life tenant of the
authority to continue mineral development, new leases granted after the expiration of leases in force at the creation of the life estate are not entitled to
the benefits of the open mine rule. 17 1 The court found no such authority in
72
the instrument before it and granted judgment for the remaindermen.1
Constructive Trusts. Ginther v. Taub 173 involved a suit seeking damages and
imposition of a constructive trust on an oil and gas lease. Two owners of an
oil and gas lease transferred their interests to a third owner, relying on the
false assurances of the latter's attorney that the transferors would be permit162. 660 S.W.2d at 598-99.
163. Id. at 599.
164. 673 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

165. Id. at 252.
166. 414 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1967).
167. Id. at 439.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 673 S.W.2d at 252 (citing Moore v. Vines, 474 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. 1971) (new leases do
not operate as open mines until the vesting of the life estate)).
171. 673 S.W.2d at 252.
172. Id. at 252-53.
173. 675 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. 1984).
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ted to reacquire the interest at a later date. No evidence indicated that the
third owner participated in or had knowledge of his attorney's misrepresentations. The issue before the court was whether a constructive trust could be
imposed against the third owner by virtue of the fraudulent action of his
attorney. The court resolved the issue in favor of the transferors, holding
that the policy against unjust enrichment mandated that the third owner not
be allowed to retain the property received as a result of his attorney's
fraud. 174 The court noted that a constructive trust based on a prior confidential relationship, unfair conduct, or unjust enrichment provides an exception to the statute of frauds rule that prohibits title to real property from
resting in parol.175
In Stout v. Clayton 176 the grantor conveyed real property to the grantees
to qualify the grantor for Medicaid. The grantor believed she could not
receive Medicaid if she owned the property. After her death, the grantor's
successors sought to set aside the deed and to have a constructive trust imposed on the property.' 77 The court stated that a constructive trust should
not be imposed to aid a grantor in regaining property deeded to a grantee for
the purpose of defrauding the grantor's creditors.17 8 The court, however,
found no evidence in the record that the grantor attempted to defraud her
creditors by means of the conveyance.' 7 9 Absent evidence that the conveyance aided the grantor in obtaining Medicaid, and since the federal government was not a creditor of the grantor, the court found no fraudulent
conveyance that barred the imposition of a constructive trust.18 0 The court
imposed a constructive trust on the property since the evidence indisputably
established a confidential relationship between the grantor and grantees. 8 1
Eminent Domain. City ofAustin v. Casiraghi8 2 involved an eminent domain
proceeding in which the principal issue concerned the legality of money
damages awarded for condemned property. The property owners received
an award that included both the value of a restaurant operated on the property and the market value of the property itself. The court observed that in
eminent domain proceedings the property owner has an opportunity to recover damages for the taking of his property for public use, since the proce174. Id. at 726-27 (citing Morris v. Morris, 642 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. 1982); Pope v. Garrett,
147 Tex. 18, 211 S.W.2d 559 (1948)).
175. 675 S.W.2d at 728 (citing Pope v. Garrett, 147 Tex. 18, 20, 211 S.W.2d 559, 561
(1948)).
176. 674 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
177. Id. at 823-24; see Mills v. Gray, 147 Tex. 33, 38-40, 210 S.W.2d 985, 988 (1948).
178. 674 S.W.2d at 826 (citing Dellerman v. Mangold, 271 S.W.2d 720, 721 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd)). The Stout court stated that when parties transfer land

in constructive fraud of creditors, the policy of the law is to "leave the parties in the position in
which they placed themselves, and any agreement on the part of the fraudulent grantees to
hold the property in trust and to reconvey it will, therefore, not be entered." 674 S.W.2d at 827
(citing Leal v. Cortez, 603 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ)).
179. 674 S.W.2d at 827.
180. Id. at 828.
181. Id.
182. 656 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
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dure is governed by statutory requirements 83 that must be strictly
observed.' 8 4 To recover the value of a business operated on real property
involved in an eminent domain proceeding, a property owner must either
plead an independent cause of action for inverse condemnation or establish
in the eminent domain proceeding that the market value of his real property
is greater because it is uniquely suited to the business conducted thereon.18 5
The court in Casiraghi found that the property owner failed to bring an
independent cause of action to recover for the loss of his business.' 86 The
court also found that the evidence established that the value of the business
87
represented only goodwill or the value of the business as a going concern.1
The property owner did not establish that the market value of the conbecause it was uniquely suited to the business
demned realty was enhanced
88
conducted thereon.1
Real Estate Brokers. Riley v. Powell' 8 9 involved a suit for specific performance of a written contract for the sale of an apartment complex. In consummating the transaction the buyer acted as the real estate broker for the seller.
The court determined that a fiduciary relationship existed between the buyer
and seller, imposing on the buyer the duty to protect and preserve the best
interests of the seller, including the procurement of the best price possible for
the property.' 90 The buyer breached his fiduciary obligation to the seller
since he knew, or had reason to believe, that the property was worth considThe court determined that the conerably more than the purchase price. 19 1 92
tract of sale was voidable by the seller.'
In Heald v. Texas Real Estate Recovery Fund19 3 the court considered
whether the provisions of the Real Estate License Act' 94 applied to a licensed real estate agent who, acting as a principal in a real estate transaction, engaged in conduct prohibited under the Act. The Act entitles
183.
184.
S.W.2d
185.

Id. at 578; see TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3265 (Vernon 1968).
656 S.W.2d at 579 (citing Coastal Indus. Water Auth. v. Celanese Corp. of Am., 592
597 (Tex. 1979); City of Bryan v. Moehlman, 155 Tex. 45, 282 S.W.2d 687 (1955)).
656 S.W.2d at 579-80; see TEX. CONsT. art. I, § 17.

186. 656 S.W.2d at 580.

187. Id. at 581.
188. Id. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Phillips argued that, contrary to the conclusion of the majority, the property owner properly sought damages for the destruction of its

restaurant business and was entitled to recover therefor. Id. at 584 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
189. 665 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
190. Id. at 580 (citing Ramsey v. Gordon, 567 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978,

writ ref'd n.r.e.); Burleson v. Earnest, 153 S.W.2d 869, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1941,
writ ref'd w.o.m.)).
191. 665 S.W.2d at 581. The evidence indicated that the property was possibly worth
$700,000 instead of the $420,000 purchase price. The buyer, as real estate agent, had one offer
for the property in the amount of $700,000, which tlhe buyer did not disclose to the seller. Id.
at 580-81.
192. Id. at 581. In Ramsey v. Gordon, 567 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1978, writ
refd n.r.e.), the Waco court of appeals held that when an agent breaches his duty to his principal by becoming personally interested in an agency agreement, the contract is voidable at the
election of the principal who was without full knowledge of the facts surrounding the agent's
interest. Id. at 871.
193. 669 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
194. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 1985).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol, 39

aggrieved persons suffering monetary damages due to unlawful acts committed by licensed real estate brokers or salesmen to receive reimbursement
from the Real Estate Recovery Fund. 195 The defendant was a licensed real
estate broker who had entered into a partnership for the purpose of buying
and selling real property. The plaintiff brought this action against the partner, claiming that she had been defrauded with respect to certain partnership
real estate proceeds. After obtaining a judgment against defendant, the defrauded partner filed a claim with the Texas Real Estate Commission for
payment from the Real Estate Recovery Fund for the actual loss suffered.
The court held that reimbursement from the Real Estate Recovery Fund
was available only in situations in which the conduct complained of was
committed in the scope of activity as broker or salesman under the Real
Estate License Act.196 The court then found that the defendant, in breaching the partnership agreement to share the proceeds of the sale of partnership property, had acted as a principal and not as a real estate agent or
broker. 197 The court, therefore, held that the Real Estate License Act did
1 98
not cover the defendant's actions.
In Burnett v. Foley'99 the court considered whether licensed real estate
agents are entitled to recover from the Real Estate Recovery Fund. In Burnett real estate agents sued the real estate broker with whom they had associated to recover their commission from the sale of certain property. The
parties reached a compromise settlement agreement, which the broker subsequently breached. The agents then filed a claim for reimbursement from the
Real Estate Recovery Fund. The court held that real estate sales agents are
not aggrieved persons within the meaning of the Real Estate License Act
and, therefore, have no right of recovery thereunder. 2° ° In light of the public policy the Act was designed to serve, the provisions of the Act regarding
reimbursement from the recovery fund clearly established that the general
public, rather than licensed real estate salespersons, are the persons for
whom the protection was designed. 20° The court emphasized that a person
licensed under the Real Estate License Act is not automatically precluded
195. Id. pt. l(a).

196. 669 S.W.2d at 181.
197. Id.
198. Id. As a result of a 1983 amendment to the Real Estate License Act, the phrase "in
the scope of activity which constitutes a broker or salesman" was deleted and the use of the
fund was limited to a violation of § 15(3), which covers a licensee who "when selling, buying,
trading, or renting real property in his own name, engaged in misrepresentation or dishonest or
fraudulent action," or § 15(4), which is applicable when a "licensee has failed within a reasonable time to make good a check issued to the commission after the commission has mailed a
request for payment by certified mail to the licensee's last known business address as reflected
by the commission's records." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, §§ 15(3), (4) (Vernon
Supp. 1985). Damages resulting to a person from conduct that constitutes fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, false pretenses, or trickery by a real estate licensee acting in the capacity of
broker or salesman are not longer reimbursable from the Real Estate Recovery Fund. In light
of the 1983 amendment, however, the conduct complained of in the Heald case apparently
would give rise to a right to reimbursement from the fund.
199. 660 S.W.2d 884 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, no writ).
200. Id. at 886-87.
201. Id. at 887.
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from recovery from the Real Estate Recovery Fund by virtue of his status as
been a principal
a licensee. 20 2 To recover from the fund a licensee must 2have
03
in the transaction for which reimbursement is sought.
Damage to Real Property. Porras v. Craig2° 4 involved the measure of damages for permanent damage to land resulting from the cutting down of shade
trees. The Texas Supreme Court applied the general damages rule that the
measure of permanent damage to real property is the difference in the mar20 5
ket value of the land immediately before and immediately after the injury.
The court held that opinion testimony of the owner of the land as to its
market value was admissible, 20 6 even if the owner failed to qualify as an
expert witness. 20 7 The court found, however, that the opinion testimony
given by the owner concerned the personal value and not the diminished
market value of the land and, therefore, reversed the decision of the court of
appeals. 20 8 The court, nevertheless, decided that a conditional measure of
damages, based upon the intrinsic value of the trees removed, should be applied. 20 9 The intrinsic value rule is applied in situations in which the reduction in market value test will not adequately compensate the injured
party. 210 In these cases the court will award damages for the loss of intrinsic
value caused by the removal of trees or other vegitation. 2 11 The court found
evidence in the record to2 12support recovery under this theory and remanded
the case for a new trial.
Slander of Title. In Ellis v. Waldrop213 appellee Waldrop sold two and onehalf acres of a seven and one-half acre tract to Ellis and granted Ellis a right
of first refusal to the remaining five acres. Waldrop then entered into an
agreement for the sale of the remaining five acres to a third party. Waldrop's attorney notified Ellis by letter of the agreement. Waldrop sued to
remove the cloud on title caused by Ellis's right of first refusal, which Ellis
refused to release of record. The trial court found that Ellis had failed to
exercise his right of first refusal in accordance with the terms of the agreement and awarded Waldrop damages for slander of title. 2 14 The court found
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id.
675 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1984).
Id. at 504 (citing Cummer-Graham Co. v. Maddox, 155 Tex. 284, 285 S.W.2d 932

(1956)).
206. 675 S.W.2d at 504 (citing State v. Carpenter, 26 Tex. 604, 89 S.W.2d 194 (1936); 2 R.
RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL & CRIMINAL § 1422 (3d ed. 1983)).

207. 675 S.W.2d at 504 (citing State v. Berzer, 480 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
208. 675 S.W.2d at 505.
209. Id. at 506 (citing Miloscar v. Gonzales, 619 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1981, no writ); Hamilton v. Fant, 422 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1967, no
writ); Moran Corp. v. Murray, 381 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1964, no writ);
Lucas v. Morrison, 286 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, no writ)).
210. 675 S.W.2d at 506.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Id. at 507.
656 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1983).
Id. at 903-04.
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that Ellis's failure to release his purported interest in the tract was a breach
of the right of first refusal21 5agreement because it hindered the plaintiff's efforts to develop the land.
Appellees Wilemon and Mahoney, who-had purchased the five-acre tract
from Waldrop, alleged that they had been hindered in their efforts to develop
the tract and sought damages resulting therefrom. They admitted, however,
that they had not desired or attempted to sell the land. The damages sought
included property taxes and mortgage interest incurred during the period of
impairment. The Texas Supreme Court, relying upon its decision in A.H.
Belo Corp. v. Sanders,21 6 held that to recover damage for disparagement of
title a plaintiff must allege the loss of a specific sale. 217 The court noted that,
although the failure to release a purported property interest can be the basis
for a cause of action in slander of title, no Texas court had ever awarded
damages "under the rubric 'cloud on title.' "218 The court, therefore, re219
versed the judgment of the lower court and denied damages.
Justice Spears concurred in the result, but disagreed with the majority's
view that A.H. Belo Corp. controlled the disposition of the case. 220 Justice
Spears pointed out that the specific sale rule in disparagement of title cases
221
allowed damages only for special damages in the form of pecuniary losses.
Those losses must be proven with sufficient certainty to avoid speculation by
the factfinder. 222 Justice Spears reasoned that Wilemon and Mahoney had
not pleaded the loss of a particular sale; rather, they pleaded that Ellis's
actions prevented them from obtaining a loan on the property because they
22 3
could not obtain title insurance without a waiver and release from Ellis.
Justice Spears agreed, however, that Wilemon and Mahoney were properly
denied recovery because they failed to show any particulars of such a
loan. 224 In concluding, Justice Spears observed that although no Texas case
appeared to have either allowed or denied recovery in a slander of title case
after proving delays in financing resulting from malicious assertion of title by
third persons, his decision did not narrow A.H Belo Corp. to foreclose such
225
a possibility.
MunicipalAnnexation. In City of Longview v. State ex rel. Spring Hill Utility
District226 the Texas Supreme Court reviewed a quo warranto action contesting the validity of ordinances by the city of Longview that annexed the
Spring Hill Utility District. The Spring Hill Utility District was a water
215. Id. at 904.
216. 632 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1982).
217. 656 S.W.2d at 905.
218. Id.
219. Id.

220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. (Spears, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 906.
Id.

224. Id.
225. Id.

226. 657 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1983).
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control and improvement district, consisting of one large tract of land and
two smaller tracts located approximately six miles from the main tract. The
main tract of land was adjacent to the Longview city limits and was within
Longview's three and one-half mile extraterritorial jurisdiction. Two
smaller annexed tracts were not adjacent to Longview and were not within
its extraterritorial jurisdiction. The court noted that article 1175227 limited
annexation to territory adjacent to a city, while article 970a 22 8 limited annexation to territory within the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a city. 2 2 9 Article 970a also requires that a city annex the entire portion of a water or sewer
district and not merely one part.23 0 The court found that Longview had
sequentially adopted four annexation ordinances with each ordinance annexing land adjacent to land annexed in the preceding ordinance. 231 Longview,
therefore, annexed land that was entirely within its extraterritorial jurisdiction, as extended by each ordinance, and annexed the entire water district in
compliance with the adjacency limitation of article 1175 and the extraterritorial jurisdiction limitation of article 970a. 232 The court observed that the
moment the Longview city council annexed the main tract of the utility district, the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction immediately expanded three and
one-half miles beyond the main tract.233 The court concluded that article
970a requires a city to annex a water district in its entirety, but does not
require a city to annex the entire district in one ordinance; the use of four
ordinances to achieve the annexation did not, therefore, make the annexa234
tion invalid.
Nuisance. The issue confronting the San Antonio court of appeals in Otten
v. Town of China Grove235 was the validity of a municipal ordinance prohibiting horse racing within the town limits. The court observed that sections
11 and 28 of article 1015 empowered a municipality to abate and remove
nuisances and prohibit horse racing in the streets. 236 The court emphasized,
however, that a municipality may not arbitrarily categorize a particular ac227. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art 1175 (Vernon 1983).
228. Id. art. 970a.
229. 657 S.W.2d at 430.
230. Id. Section 11(B) of article 970a specifically provides that "[a] city may not annex
territory within the boundaries of a water or sewer district unless it annexes the entire portion
of the district that is outside the city's boundaries." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 970a,
§ 11(B) (Vernon 1983).
231. 657 S.W.2d at 430-31.
232. Id. at 431. The Texas Supreme Court pointed out that a city can easily extend its
extraterritorial jurisdiction by passing successive ordinances. The Municipal Annexation Act
provides that "[w]hen a city annexes additional territory, the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
such city shall expand in conformity with such annexation." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
970a, § 3(C) (Vernon 1968).
233. 657 S.W.2d at 431 n.2.
234. Id. at 431. The supreme court noted that the legislative purpose in enacting § II(B)
was to prevent double taxation and the confusion of services; the section was not to be used as
a tool for impeding municipal annexation. Id. The legislative purpose is satisfied whether the
entire district is annexed in one or more ordinances. Id.
235. 660 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ dism'd).
236. Id. at 567; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1015, §§ 11, 28 (Vernon 1963).
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tivity as a nuisance unless it is a nuisance per se at common law. 23 7 Stating
that horse racing has not been declared a nuisance by the legislature nor is it
otherwise illegal, the court held that the ordinance was not a valid abatement of a nuisance. 238 Moreover, since the effect of the ordinance was to
prohibit horse racing on private property, it did not represent a valid 2exer39
cise of the municipality's power to prevent horse racing in the streets.
Condominiums. Major Investments, Inc. v. De Castillo24° involved the question of whether under the Texas Condominium Act 24 1 the existence of a
condominium regime is a prerequisite to the independent sale of condominium units. In this case the buyer contracted to buy a unit in an unestablished condominium regime. The court noted that the Texas Condominium
Act appeared to require the submission of a condominium regime as a prerequisite to the conveyance of individual units. 242 The court, nevertheless,
concluded that failure to comply with the Act does not render a contract for
sale of a condominium unit void as a matter of law. 243 Contrary to the
contention of the buyer, the court held that the contract was not vague,
indefinite, and wholly insufficient under the statute of frauds 244 solely because it referred to a condominium unit not yet constructed. 245 The court
found that the land conveyed could be identified with reasonable certainty
from the description attached to the contract and that such description was
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.; see All Tex. Racing Ass'n v. State, 82 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1935), affid, 128 Tex. 384, 97 S.W.2d 669 (1936).
240. 673 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
241. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a (Vernon 1980).
242. 673 S.W.2d at 281. Sections 3 and 4 of the Texas Condominium Act provide as
follows:
Sec. 3. When a developer, the sole owner, or the co-owners of a building or
buildings or proposed building or buildings expressly declares, through the recordation of a master deed, lease, or declaration ... their desire to submit their
property to the regime established by this Act, there shall be thereby established
a condominium regime.
Sec. 4. Once the property is submitted to the condominium regime, an apartment in the project may be individually conveyed and encumbered and may be
the subject of ownership, possession or sale and of all types of judicial acts, as if
it were entirely independent of the other apartments in the project of which they
form a part, and the corresponding individual titles and interests shall be
recordable.
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a, §§ 3, 4 (Vernon 1980).
243. 673 S.W.2d at 281. The buyer also contended that the contract was void because it
failed to comply with TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6626(c) (Vernon Supp. 1985), which
prohibits the use of a subdivision description in a contract of sale unless an approved subdivi-

sion plat has been filed of record. The court dismissed this contention on the ground that the
contract contained a metes and bounds description of the real property in addition to references to a unit number and building designation. 673 S.W.2d at 281. In dismissing the buyer's
further contention that the contract was void because it failed to comply with the requirements
of the Texas Condominium Act, the court explained that, unlike article 6626(c), the Texas
Condominium Act is not penal in nature and, therefore, lack of compliance therewith does not
render a contract void as a matter of law. Id. at 280.
244. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
245. 673 S.W.2d at 281.
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246
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds.

246. Id.

299

